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Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
The following four papers are amplifications of a panel discussion on the subject
that was held at the History and Philosophy of Science Section of the 33rd Annual
Meeting of the Minnesota Academy of Science on May 8, 1965. The authors are
respectively, philosopher, philosopher, physkist, and psychologist. Dr. McMullin,
Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, was
at the Philosophy Department of the University of Minnesota at the time the Meeting was held. He acted as chairman of the section meeting.

ERNAN M c MULLIN
University of N otre Dame
Does science follow some sort of standard procedure ,
something that can be specified and communicated?
Three centuries ago, Francis Bacon 1 prophesied confidently that such a procedure could be devised so that the
whole business of science could be done "as though by
machinery." In the years between, scientific research has
grown from an obscure and unrecognized undertaking of
a handful of virtuosos to a massive and concerted endeavor on the part of hundreds of thousands of persons .
What has made such a fantastic expansion possible in
such a short time? Is it that people have been taught the
steps by which science is carried on, so that they can go
off and carry research further on their own? This is the
impression given by many elementary textbooks of science; indeed, this " Baconian" view of science is found on
occasion among those who are themselves di stinguish ed
for their scientific work. 2
1. The Answer From Early Greek Science

Before trying to answer the question posed in our title,
it might be of some interest to seek the answer from
those in whose minds science first took: shape: the natural philosophers of ancient Greece. It was a question
that they quite often thought of ( one of Ari stotle's most
influential works, Posterior Analytics, was largely con,:, B. Sc. in Physics. 1945 . B. D . in Theology, 1948, Maynooth
College. Ireland; followed by graduate work in theoretical physics under E. Schri:idinger at Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1949-50. Ph . D. in philosophy, Louvain University, Belgium,
1954. Disse rtation: Th e quantum princ iple of 1111cer1ai11ty . Joined
staff of Department of Philosophy. Un iversity of Notre Dame
1959; C hairman, September 1965 - . Two years research in philosophy of science, Yale University, under N.S.F. grant, 1957-59.
Member of advisory panel on History and Philosophy of Science
of N. S. F., 1963-1965; chairm an of N. S. F. panel on traineeships
in History and Philosophy of Science. 1965. President, Ame rican
Catholic Philosophical Association, 1966-1967. Editor, The concept of matter, Notre Dame Press, 1963; editor, Galileo, Basic
Books (in press ); editor, Fu11da111 e111als of Logic series, PrenticeHall.
1
N ovwn Orgam1111 ( 1620) Preface.
• E. g., J. R. Platt's emphatic de fense of the view in ''Strong
inference: the new Baconians." Scienc<', 146, 1964, 347-353. He
argued that the rapid advances in recent biochemistry are a result of consistent application of a definite easil y stated method.
and he suggested that the relatively slower development of
other areas can be attributed to a refusal ( often on the score
of prejudice) to adopt the Baconian method.
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cerncd with it). Their attempts to answer the question
were dominated by two special assumptions. First, they
assum ed that episteme, true knowledge, ought to have
some warrant by which men might com e to recognize it.
In one of his best remembered myths, Plato hinted that
such recognition might be extremely difficult to accomplish; he spoke of the difficulty of seeing by sunlight after living for years in a ca ve. ln his mind, there was no
guaranteed way of bringing someone to see a truth as
"science" ; an approach by indirection, in which someone
already in command of the truth would gradually lead
an enquirer by skillful questioning to see the truth for
himself, seemed to him ( at least in bis earlier works) to
be the only feasible way. In such a view, the discovery
of an entirely new truth appeared beyond the power of
man , and Plato did, in fact, suggest tbat all apparent di scovery is a "recollection" of some sort. Aristotle, on the
other hand, was more optimistic about the possibility of
specifying procedures-in principle open to everyonethat would mark off "science'' from other forms of
knowledge. Chief among these procedures was the logical frame of the syllogism: clear-cut, easily grasped, definitive in its deductive certitude.
This brings us to the second major influence on Greek
thinking about science: axiomatic geometry. It was by
far the most successful of the theoretical knowledges
available at the time. It was certain, stable, and gave an
exact knowledge about the spatial structures of the world.
It possessed a method, the deductive axiomatic, that
could be learned even by the young . It was natural, in
consey_uence, to think of it as the model of what "science" should be, something with a specifiable method of
procedure (possibly even a deductive one) that wou ld
serve to justify any thesis that could lay proper claim to
the title "science."
Yet the model had one major problem. Theorems were
easy to verify and relatively easy to discover. But what
about the axioms, the "principles" or starting-points'/
Was there any method for deriving and justifying them'I
Aristotle spoke of an "induction" ( epag6ge) , which led
to the di scovery of first principles, but he was never very
definite about how it ought to work. Sometimes, if the
analogy of geometry were stressed, it seemed to be an
intellectual inspection of statements that were seen to be
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necessarily true, once their terms were fully understood.
At other times, when Aristotle the patient experimental
biologist was speaking, it sounded more like the collecting of relevant empirical data with a view to careful generalization. But in the latter case, how could the resultant
"axiom" be stated with anything more than a high degree of probability? The tension between these two
ideals, one deriving from geometry and the other from
actual practice in biology and medicine, dominated much
of the discussion of scientific method right up to the seventeenth century. 3 But since it was assumed without
question that the proper method for science ought to be
inferred from a general theory of knowledge of reality,
rather than derived from below in a makeshift manner
from observational techniques and practices of discovery, the axiomatic notion of "science" was the one generally accepted.
2. The Seventeenth-Century Answer

In the seventeenth century, natural science was gradually transformed under the impact of the ideas of men
like Galileo, Boyle, Descartes, and Newton. It is striking
to note that these pioneers assumed, as their predecessors
had, that science does have a perfectly definite method,
and that it can, in fact, be marked off from other forms
of knowledge by the possession of such a method. They
thought, however, that their own methods were importantly different from all that had gone before; some, like
Bacon, stressed this "renovation" more than others, but
all of them did in fact suppose that their "new science"
was "new" principally because of its procedures. It was
characteristic that they had much to say about method,
though few of them went so far as to devote a special
treatise to it, as Descartes did. But, when one looks at
what they had to say, a surprise is in store; the difference
between their methodology and that of their predecessors
was not nearly as great as they claimed.' And this is true
whether one examines their explicit methodology (i.e.,
their formal discussions of method), or their implicit
methodology (inferred from their actual scientific practice). There were differences, of course: a greater stress
on the empirical side of science, the planning of controlled experimental tests, the extensive use of mathematics at all levels, the increasing reliance on technological insights .... And these were, of course, quite decisive
differences.
But one thing had not changed much: the axiomatic
ideal of a science whose "principles" would be seen to
have a conceptually necessary character, an ideal that
seemed to many to be completely achieved in the mechanics of Newton. It was still plausible to think of experiment as an occasion of discovery rather than as an
ultimate warrant. Galileo frequently spoke of the perceptual realm in the accents of Plato; it seems as though he
'For a fuller treatment, see McMullin, E. (1964) "The nature of scientific enquiry: what makes it science?" in Technology
and Culture, G . McLean (Ed.) . Washington: Catholic University Press. Pp. 28-54.
'See E. Grant, "Late medieval thought, Copernicus, and the
scientific revolution," Joum. Hist. Ideas, 30, 1962, 197-220.
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thought of his experiments, in mechanics at least, more
as a means of discovery or of persuasion; they could be
discarded once one had come to "see" the truths. Bacon,
it was true, took a far more empirical line, but it had
very little echo in the actual practice of mechanics. In
areas like chemistry, biology, and magnetism, research
followed a much less deductivist approach, but it was
natural to assume that this was only because of the complexity and relatively undeveloped character of these researches, by comparison with the sophistication of mechanics.
Thus, by the eighteenth century the answer to the
question, "Is there a well-defined scientific method?"
would have been an emphatic "yes" from most of the
scientists of the day. If asked what that method was, they
would have differed; and the differences would have
been especially marked between the Cartesian physicists
of France and the Newtonian physicists of England. The
former would have stressed the role of deduction and
conceptually necessary first principles much more than
the Newtonians did; the latter would have talked about
exact observations and the use of hypothesis (in less developed areas like optics, at least). But the Cartesians
made observations, of course, and the Newtonians distrusted hypothesis and always hoped for something like
Newton's axiomatic Principia in every area of science.
Among scientists, therefore, there were really no pure
rationalists or pure empiricists.
It was only with the nineteenth century that a tenable
middle road between the two extremes began to reveal
itself. But it meant giving up the older Greek ideal of an
axiomatic empirical science that had been built on intuitively warranted first principles. And this was not easy
to do in this century of Newtonian triumph. Methodologists like Whewell and Peirce were analyzing the actual
procedures of the scientist with a precise attention to detail, and with much less assurance than their predecessors that methodology ought to be derivable from a general epistemology. If anything, they took just the opposite point of view. Instead of regarding hypothesis as a
sort of crutch at the level of discovery-to be discarded
when the level of justification was reached-they recognized the inescapably hypothetical character of any empirical knowledge that lays claim to generality and precision. They noted that hypotheses are warranted by the
continued verification of predictions made by their
means. Our basic reason for accepting a scientific theory
is not that its terms are seen to be conceptually related
in a way seen intuitively to be "right," but, rather, that
it provides predictions that are borne out, besides being
fruitful in suggesting conceptual interconnections with
other theories as well as possible expansions into new
areas. The method of science was thus said to be "hypothetico-deductive."
Over against this view, Mill was arguing the older
Baconian thesis of an inductive and relatively automatic
way of ascending from individual observations to higher
and higher generalizations, by the careful planning of
experimental comparisons and checks. He devised his
famous "methods" of sameness, difference, and concomi23

tant variation, which he thought to be a summary of the
best experimental practice of his day. If one followed his
methods-and they were not difficult to grasp-the implication was that science could then proceed in a steady
and decisive manner. The teaching of the young research
scientist ought thus to center around the accurate grasp
of the "methods." The trouble was that many of the
century's major advances in science seemed quite remote
from anything resembling a persistent application of the
"methods": Maxwell had certainly not gone through any
such procedures in formulating his electromagnetic
theory of radiation, nor had thermodynamics depended
much on their employment either.
This brings us to our own century. It began with the
replacement of Newtonian mechanics by the more general and conceptually quite different system of Einstein .
The best support of the rationalist theory of method was
thus destroyed: One could no longer point to mechanics
as a prime example of an empirical science built on intrinsically cogent principles and requiring no extrinsic
hypothetico-deductive support. But it was still not clear
what "the" method of science ought to be; the assumption was that such a method was gradually being revealed in the practice of science itself, with its lengthening pragmatic record of successes and failures. Now that
science was becoming a dominant force for shaping the
world to man's desires, the problem of how to train good
scientists was coming to the fore. And science was beginning to play a much larger part in education generally
than had ever been the case before. In the circumstances,
it was inevitable that textbooks tended to speak of "the
scientific method" as something definite and teachable,
something already achieved . Yet doubts about this optimistic appraisal have continued to increase. In the remainder of this introductory essay, some elementary distinctions will be very briefly outlined in order to facilitate
discussion of the present state of the question.
3. The Maior Procedures of Scientific Enquiry
It is customary to distinguish between three logically
different types of procedure in science, as follows:
( 1 ) Deduction. One infers from premiss (evidence)
to conclusion, in a way that is altogether rule-bound.
The rules of deduction are in principle completely specifiable, and it is possible to test to see whether they have
been correctly used . If they have, our result is validated,
and no further evidence need be sought. This is the paradigm of the "well defined method," and it is found in
its pure form in certain parts of the formal scienceslogic and mathematics. If a formal system is fully specified, the theorems of the system will be governed in a
decidable way by an explicit set of methodological criteria. The presumption is that a formal system is already
something given; since the theorems are already latent
in it, discovery here reduces to a drawing out of what is
already fully there. Deduction is thus very limited as a
tool of discovery, though it is the most powerful of all
tools of verification.
(2) Induction. One makes a generalization on the ba-
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sis of some singular instances satisfying the generalization. For example, one might observe a number of cases
in which potash is used as fertilizer and make the generalization, "potash under certain (specified) circumstances promotes the growth of certain (specified)
plants." Or one might construct a continuous curve from
a finite number of laboratory results; from half a dozen
co-ordinate measurements of the relevant experimental
parameters, one might leap to a generalization such as
pv = kT . The evidence for the generalization would be
the half-dozen original results; each would be a particular instantiation for some set of values of the parameters.
Such generalizations are descriptive rather than explanatory, since they do not involve new concepts, only those
in which the original observations were expressed. The
"leap" here is not a matter of discovering new concepts,
then, but rather of going from part to whole.
Such inference is, of course, always hazardous, always
open to later disproof when other parts of the "whole"
become known or when the original "part" comes to be
more accurately known . Can it even be described properly as an "inference," i.e., a rationally explicable ruleguided procedure? It might seem more like guess work.
Yet there are at least two domains in which such partto-whole "leaps" are constantly and successfully made.
The first is that in which part and whole can be finitely
expressed and thus subjected to the techniques of mathematical probability theory. Suppose we have a large bag
of marbles and draw 10 marbles, one after another, each
of which turns out to be red . What are the odds that all
the marbles in the bag are red? Given certain assumptions about how the contents of the bag were originally
chosen, these odds can easily be calculated in a purely
formal way. On the other hand, suppose we have a shipload of bananas and want to estimate what sort of condition they are in. It would take much too long to go
through all the bunches, so we "sample" and extrapolate.
Sampling is a highly skilled job that involves a lot of
experience with the type of situation being tested. The
sampling techniques for a cargo of bananas will differ
greatly from those used for a storehouse of canned goods
or for a city water supply. The techniques will implicitly
involve not only probability theory, but, in addition ,
empirical knowledge about, for example, the spoilage
causes of bananas, the layout of the particular ship, etc.
Though this knowledge may be explicitly formulatable,
more often than not the sampler's skill is of an "intuitive" sort. He tends to rely on clues and generalizations that he cannot make explicit.
Part-whole inference in experimental science has
something of both of these: it relies on probabHity theory
as well as on the developed skill of the "sampler." Thus,
its procedures are partly formal and deductive, and partly informal and dependent upon a considerable experience with the type of situation being investigated. In
practice, the commonest form of scientific induction is
that involved in "curve fitting," i.e., in going from a finite
number of observations to a functional correlation. In a
quantified science, all experimental evidence must be

The Minnesota Academy of Science

expressed in terms of such "laws"; until such reproducibility is reached, there can be no assurance that an adequate statement of the relevant causal factors has been
given. The "inferring" of a smooth curve from a discrete
number of small fuzzy points ( each involving some degree of possible experimental error) involves assumptions about the most likely form of curve, assumptions
that are part aesthetic and part empirical ( derived from
previous acquaintance with similar types of experimental
situation) .• They can be formalized, up to a point, especially if some criterion of mathematical "simplicity" is
agreed upon. But the result is, of course, never more
than probable. And there is no way of providing a reliable mathematical estimate of this probability. That is,
when we formulate a complex empirical law, there is no
way of estimating the likelihood of relevant factors having been omitted in making the "leap" from part to
whole.
(3) Retroduction. Instead of trying to generalize, we
may wish to "explain," that is, to find an hypothesis in
terms of which the given data will become more intelligible to us. Without dwelling on the complexity of the
notion of "intelligibility" involved here, it is possible to
specify that the data must be deducible from the hypothesis ( or at least from the hypothesis plus other accepted hypotheses), that the hypothesis should not be ad
hoc but have a certain generality, a capacity for unifying
previously discrete domains of evidence, and that it introduce new conceptual elements (e.g., a model) not directly contained in the original statement of the evidence.
Does the formation of hypotheses follow any "rule," any
specifiable guidelines of the sort we found in deduction
and induction? There has been a great deal of writing
about creativity of late; 6 it seems to be fairly generally
agreed that to be creative is precisely to operate outside
the pattern of accepted rule, to juxtapose matrices of
thought not hitherto related (as Koestler puts it). 7 To
hit upon a hypothesis is, in general, not something rulebound, and this is the more true the more basic the new
hypothesis is.
Yet, though this is so, there will usually be at least
some guide-lines, some restrictions on the direction one
might most profitably follow in seeking an explanation.
These guidelines will be of a "material" sort, that is,
they will be entirely dependent upon the sort of "material" we are working with. If we are trying to find a
hypothesis to account for certain patterns of scattering
that occur when an electron beam hits metal foil, experience suggests that some internal structure in the atoms
of the foil may "account for" it (i.e., serve as a hypothesis from which it may be deduced) . What is required
'In The Methods of contemporary thought (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1965), Bochenski listed four assumptions that are basic to induction. (He took "induction" in a considerably wider sense
than we have done here, however.)
• See the references given in McMullin, E. ( 1965) "Creativity
and scientific discovery." In Freedom and man, J. C. Murray.
(Ed.) New York. Pp. 105-130.
7
In his recent exhaustive and challenging work, The act of
creation, New York, 1964.
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here is an intimate knowledge of the materials involved,
of the historical development of theories concerning
them, of conceivable interconnections with other domains, etc. None of this yields anything like general rules
of hypothesis formation; it will entirely depend on the
circumstances. But it must be emphasized that when a
scientist does form an hypothesis, it is usually by no
means a mere guess; it is informed by a definite personal
skill in interpreting his domain and he could, if necessary, specify (up to a point) the sort of "reasoning" that
led him to this particular hypothesis.
We can thus think of deduction as purely formal, i.e.,
entirely independent of the context of application; retroduction, on the other hand, is wholly material, i.e., context-dependent, involving an insight into, and prior theoretical knowledge of, the particular material context
under investigation. While induction is a mixture of formal and material; insofar as it employs mathematical
theories of generalization drawn from probability theory,
it is formal, whereas to the extent that it demands specific knowledge of the type of situation being generalized,
it is material.
Retroduction is equivalent above to hypothesis-formation. If one looks at the classic discussion of it by Peirce,
or the more recent treatments by Hanson and Bochenski,
one finds a recurrent ambiguity. 8 Peirce contrasted it
with deduction by saying that deduction follows the pattern, p implies q, p is the case, . ·. q is the case; whereas
retroduction (he also called it "abduction" or "reduction") is of the form, q is the case, p ➔ q, .". probably
p. Now if retroduction be defined in this way, it is equivalent to the process by which we go from q (evidence)
and p ➔ q ( a particular hypothesis implies this evidence) to the assertion that the hypothesis is worthy of
qualified support. But this presupposes that the hypothesis has already been hit upon. In other words, what we
spoke of as "retroduction" above was the movement of
thought from evidence ( q) back to hypothesis (p). The
retroduction is already contained in Peirce's premiss p ➔
q, though the movement of thought would suggest that we
alter the direction of the arrow.
Much of the recent controversy over whether or not
there is a "logic of discovery" might have been avoided
if this simple ambiguity had been noted. The ambiguity
originally arose from the attempt to involve hypothesis
in some sort of scheme of types of "inference," which
would aliow a neat three-fold division with deduction
and induction as two of the types. But "inference" itself
here can be taken in two rather different senses, depending on whether discovery or justification be the aspect
stressed. To infer a conclusion from two premises in a
syllogism can be regarded either as discovery of the conclusion (taking it to be previously unknown) or as justification of the conclusion ( taking the premises as evidence). In deduction, to discover is to justify, and vice
"Peirce. (1931-5), Collected papers. P. Weiss and C. Hartshorne. (Eds.) Harvard U.P., I, 71-4; II, 372-88; V, 189; VI,
477, 522-8. N. R. Hanson. ( 1963) "Retroductive inference." In
Philosophy of science , B. Baumrin. (Ed.) New York. Pp. 21-37 .
I. Bochenski. op. cit.
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versa. The same is true in induction: The procedure that
leads us to the generalization is also the procedure that
justifies our making this particular generalization.' In
the domains of deduction and induction, therefore, the
methodologies of discovery and of j.ustification need not
be sharply distinguished.
This has had far-reaching consequences in those methodologies in which deduction and induction were the
only modes of inference recognized. Those would include
not only that of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, but also
most modern accounts, until within the past decade, at
least. In looking at the typical procedures of scientific
enquiry, it did not seem important to ask whether one
was concerned with discovery or with justification (proof,
validation), because the same procedures seemed to function in either case. It is only when hypothesis is taken
seriously as an indispensable element of enquiry that
one must be very careful to separate discovery from justification. The procedures involved in hitting upon an
hypothesis are not as a rule those in whose terms the
hypothesis could ultimately be validated.
( 4) Reduction: Thus, a distinction must be drawn between hypothesis-formation and hypothesis-justification.
The former we have called retroduction, because it involves moving "backwards" logically speaking, i.e., groping for an approximate antecedent from which the datum
can be derived. But how is an hypothesis to be justified?
At the first level, it is "justified" if the original datum can
be derived from it. If this were all that were to be said,
then retroduction would be in the same position as the
other two forms, because the procedure of discovery
would also serve as the procedure of justification. What
is crucial about hypothesis, however, is that it is not
simply justified in this simple "q, p implies q, . ·. probably
p" way. In practice, what is done is to derive a great
many new predictions from p, as much different in kind
from q as possible. These are then tested; to the extent
that they are verified, the hypothesis is progressively validated. It will be noted that the essence of this validation is not expressed by the "q, p implies q, . ·. probably
p" formula (which gives only a precondition for p to
qualify as an hypothesis). Rather it is: "p implies r, s,
t . . ., and r, s, t . . ., . ·. probably p," where r, s, t
are as different from the original datum, q, and from one
another as possible, and where they have been carefully
tested.
This "hypothetico-deductive (HD) method" ( as we
called it in Section 2) is clearly a method of validation,
not a method of discovery. It is a proper method, that is,
we are told what to do when we have an hypothesis to
justify. Though it is the commonest method of validating
hypotheses, it is not, however, the only one. Sometimes,
an appeal will be made to some intrinsic quality of the
theory, or to the way it unifies the domain without any
ad hoc assumptions. Copernicus' theory could not predict any better than Ptolemy's could ( not originally, at
least), but it "explained" something the earlier theory
• This is not altogether exact, but it is adequate as a first approximation.
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had had to leave as an extraordinary coincidence, namely
the fact that each of the planets had as one of its two
periods of epicyclic rotation a period of exactly one year.
Validation in this most famous case of scientific revolution was thus not of a HD type. But much more often,
the validation of an hypothesis will follow the HD model
exactly.
Thus if we are giving a scheme of types of inference,
we will have three types: deduction, induction, retroduction (if inference he thought of as discovery of a conclusion), or deduction, induction, HD validation ( if inference be considered as justification of a conclusion). To
have a convenient name that harmonizes with the others,
let us call HD validation "reduction." To "reduce" an
hypothesis is thus to validate it, using HD procedures.
4. Is There a Well-Defined Scientific Method?

Now we can return to the question posed in the title,
armed with the distinctions that will allow us to answer it.
Scientific enquiry contains a number of different well defined methods. Scientists make extensive use of deduction and formal mathematical procedures, which are
quite automatic in their operations. They also use induction in the formulation of empirical correlations, and
this, as we have seen, is a relatively well defined procedure, though not entirely formal, as deduction is. They
use reduction in validating hypotheses; again, this is a
reasonably well defined operation, though of course it
will take the insight of the trained mind to see which deductions and which unifications are likely to carry the
most weight as validation.
It is only when we leave aside the question of validation and ask about discovery, and specifically about the
discovery of hypotheses, that the answer becomes negative. As we have seen, retroduction is by no means a
blind leap, and yet it cannot be said to be guided by
formal rules or described by formal schemas, in even the
widest sense of the term, "formal." There is no "logic"
of hypothesis-discovery, not at least if the discovery is
one of any significance. The claim that there is such a
logic has usually rested on a confusion between retroduction ( which has no "logic") and reduction ( which does
have a "logic" of sorts).
One final word is in order. The scientist makes use of
a whole array of other procedures, differing from one science to another, most of them connected with experimental technique. Take, for example, Mill's famous "canons of method," mentioned in section 2. They have not
been included in the discussion above, and for a very
good reason, since they are not primarily "inferential," in
the sense in which we have used that term. They were
directed to the selection of significant parameters prior
to the formation of an experimental generalization or of
an hypothesis. Though they are often described as "canons of inductive method," it might be more accurate to
regard them as pre-inductive ( or less often, preretroductive). The experimental situation is a complex one, involving many different parameters. The problem always
is to pick out the ones that are significant for one's purposes, and prevent variations in the others from spoiling
The Minnesota Academy of Science

one's analysis. Before we can make an induction or a
retroduction, we must first isolate the parameters that
are likely to yield significant results. It is this feature of
enquiry that Mill wished to emphasize, but he did it in
a somewhat maladroit way by describing the selection as
"inference" and by suggesting that it was quasi-formal in
character. The use of Mill's canons would, of course, involve induction or retroduction insofar as the formulation of a law or a theory resulted. But their emphasis was
not on the way in which one got from evidence to law or
theory; rather it was on the sorts of clue that could lead
one to the significant parameters in the first place.
Likewise, one could point out various other procedures
that are integral to scientific research : construction of
apparatus, measurement, classification . . . . Some are
better defined than others, but none can be completely
formalized. There is always the stubborn complexity and
resistance of the material order, summarized in "Mur-

phy's Law" of experiment: if anything can go wrong, it
will. But when people ask "ls there a well defined scientific method?" they are not thinking of these contingencies. They are thinking of inference. And our answer to them, in short, is: justification-inference follows
relatively well defined patterns in empirical science,
though it is never completely well defined (i.e., completely formal). Whereas discovery-inference is guided
by well defined rules only where empirical correlations
are concerned, and even there, the guidance is not a coercive one. In the far more significant area of hypothesis
and theory, "methods" of discovery are tentative and
extremely limited in scope. This is where genius is needed, where the incommunicable creativity of the talented
individual sparks the gap. For genius is precisely the
ability to stray from the well defined pathways and to
find something that no amount of methodic path following would ever have revealed.

Is There a Well Defined Scientific Method?
A Philosopher's Answer
MARGUERITE FOSTER
Metropolitan State College, Denver, Colo.
ABSTRACT - Tbe question "Is There A Well Defined Scientific Method?" can not be answered
without taking into account the varying aims of scientific inquiry as conceived historically as well
as within the framework of various sciences. The term "method" is also subject to ambiguity.
The answer would seem to be negative, if we mean that there is a fixed set of well-established
rules which if followed will lead to fruitful scientific results. It is positive, if we mean that science
has developed fairly reliable patterns and criteria for acceptable explanatory laws and theories,
experimental design, and observational confirmation, that are part of the program if not the practice of scientists at the present time.

The question prompts another question that I am, in
part, inclined to suppress, namely: By what method
should one try to answer the question?
Philosophers who write about science and scientific
method disagree on whether or not the answer can be
found by reading histories of science or historical documents, or by watching scientists at work or questioning
them, or by a "rational reconstruction" of the logic of
the written works of scientists - or perhaps by all of
these plus an ingredient of the philosopher's own intuition. Even when one or the other of these approaches is
explicitly made, a philosopher reading the finished work
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will find disagreement with the correct analysis of scientific method.
Scientists in their practice of science and in their published scientific reports do not generally state their rules
of procedure, except as technical recipes. A philosopher
also does not always make clear whether he is concerned
with methods that scientists here and now do use, or
agree upon, or whether he is concerned with an ideal
logical "model" of the essential criteria of the methods,
or for the right to have confidence in such methods. My
own view is that it is actual scientific practice, within the
framework of an historical period, as far as this can be
isolated, with which a philosopher ought to be concerned. Otherwise, it is logic, or an ideal program of
what an ideally valid science should be.
If science is to be defined, or partially defined, by its
methods, it is perhaps possible at least to agree that a
method is a set of rules and procedures, either stated or
implicitly used, that can be deliberately followed and its
value tested in terms of its results. The results will be a
function of the aims. Perhaps, indeed, several methods
will reach the same results equally adequately. So much
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